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Deciding Federal Law Issues in Civil
Proceedings: State Versus
Federal Trial Courts
By LEO KANOWITZ*

Consider these situations:
One: A state legislature has just changed the basis for marriage
dissolution from a fault-oriented concept to a no-fault theory requiring
only a showing of irreconcilable differences which have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage. 1 A woman who married when

the state permitted divorce only upon a finding of specified types of
misconduct by a defendant spouse believes that, by thus changing the
basis for marriage dissolution, the state has deprived her of important
vested property rights. Essentially her position is that to permit her
husband to procure a dissolution decree under the new law would
deprive her of property without due process of law, and also violate the

federal constitutional prohibition against state impairment of contractual
obligations.2

Following her husband's filing of a dissolution petition in

an appropriate state court alleging irreconcilable differences, she peti-

tions a federal district court on the aforementioned federal constitutional
grounds to enjoin him from pursuing his state court action. 3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STATS. ANN. §§ 25-311 to 25-339 (1973); CAL. CIV.
CoDE § 4506(1) (West 1970); ORE. REv. STATS. § 107.025 (1971).
2. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472
(1972); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973).
3. At least on her impairment-of-contractual-obligations claim, petitioner runs a
severe risk of having her action dismissed by the federal court on the grounds of the
insubstantiality of the federal question, the United States Supreme Court having long
ago decided that, though an agreement to marry is a "contract" for many purposes, it
is not embraced within the notion of "contract" as that term is used in U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 10, prohibiting the states from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). However, though federal constitutional claims similar to the other ones she asserts have been rejected by some state courts (see cases cited
note 2 supra), they do not appear to have been definitely decided by the United States
Supreme Court. It is therefore assumed that these could survive a motion to dismiss
made on the alleged grounds of their insubstantiality.
[1411
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Two: The governing officials of a private university learn that
some students plan to burn down the campus ROTC building. Were

the students to do this in fact, they would violate criminal statutes
prohibiting, inter alia, arson, trespass and willful destruction of property;

they would also be civilly liable for any damage they might cause.
Nevertheless, university officials are convinced that such criminal and
civil remedies would leave much to be desired if the students actually
burned the building down. Rather than await the students' move, the
officials decide, it would be better to persuade a state court to enjoin
them from carrying out their intentions. 4 Among the advantages the
officials perceive in doing this is' that the students would thus be

deprived of rights to a jury trial and to have their guilt proved beyond a
reasonable doubt which obtain in criminal proceedings. As for the
damage remedy, because of the probable "judgment-proof' character of

the students involved, procuring the injunction, they feel, might prove to
be a classic case of an ounce of prevention being worth much more than
a pound of cure. As the students see it, however, the school officials'
move for a state court injunction is a deliberate effort to deprive them of

valuable constitutional rights. They therefore petition an appropriate
federal district court to enjoin the university officials from pursuing their
state court injunction action. 5

Three: In a grand jury hearing, an attorney testifies under a grant
of transactional immunity. Shortly thereafter, a state bar grievance
committee begins proceedings to determine whether he should be dis-

barred. In those disciplinary proceedings, the committee seeks to use
the attorney's grand jury testimony against him. The attorney contends
that such use of the testimony would violate his constitutional rights be4. Cf. Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541 (1972).
5. In Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), defendants, believing
that an ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting them from engaging in a civil rights
march violated their federal constitutional rights, defied the injunction. Their convictions for contempt were upheld by the United States Supreme Court which held that
an injunction must be obeyed, despite questions of its constitutional validity, until challenged and vacated in court. Noted the Court: "The petitioners give absolutely no explanation of why they did not make some application to the state court [which had issued the injunction] during that period." Id. at 319 (emphasis added). Neither the
Court nor the petitioners indicated, however, whether they believed that a federal court
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the state court injunction might have been procurable. From the petitioner's perspective, such a possibility would have been of academic interest only, under the circumstances, since time was of the essence. Not being
an issue in the case, any discussion of it by the Court would have been inappropriate.
For an example of a case in which a federal district court enjoined, albeit temporarily
(on grounds of its apparent unconstitutionality under the procedural due process requirements of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ) an ex parte state court order requiring
a husband sued for divorce to vacate the family home, see Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F.
Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project,
404 U.S. 541 (1972).

Winter 19761

DECIDING FEDERAL LAW ISSUES

cause of the transactional immunity granted by the grand jury. But the
committee introduces the testimony nevertheless. The attorney then
seeks a federal district court injunction against the state bar disciplinary
committee's proceedings, asserting that the committee's use of his grand
jury testimony violates his constitutional rights.6
These three situations share certain common characteristics. In
each, the initial litigation in the state court or agency is between private
litigants. 7 Secondly, on the surface at least, all three situations involve
essentially civil disputes, i.e., disputes that do not, or only remotely,
implicate the criminal statutes of the states involved. Finally, in each
case, rather than asserting federal constitutional claims as defenses in
the state proceedings, the state defendant or respondent, on the basis
of those federal constitutional claims, seeks to have a federal court enjoin one of the parties in the state tribunal from maintaining an action
there.
These situations, and others like them, raise important questions
about the relationship between state and federal courts which have yet to
be answered by the United States Supreme Court. Among these are: 1)
Do Younger v. Harris8 and companion cases holding that, in most
circumstances, a federal court should, because of considerations of
equity, comity and "Our Federalism," refrain from granting a petition to
enjoin a pending state proceeding where the constitutional claims of the
federal court petitioner can be disposed of in those state tribunals, apply
to the sorts of situations described above? 2) Does the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,9 .applying the Younger

principles to a particular type of state civil proceeding require their
application to the kinds of situations described above? 3) In examining
these questions, what light can be shed on the general problem of the
right of litigants-plaintiffs or defendants-to have federal trial courts,
rather than state trial courts, initially determine federal constitutional
claims?
To place the examination of these questions in a proper context,
some well-known principles first need to be restated. One of these
principles is that the jurisdiction of federal district courts and state trial
6. Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of City of New York, 515 F.2d 427 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3190 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
7. Arguably, in the attorney's disciplinary hearing, there is a public aspect to the
nature of the proceedings and the character of at least one of the parties, the state bar

committee.
8. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
9. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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courts is, in many areas, concurrent. 10 Another is that this is true not
only of the diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332,11 but
also of the federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.12
And a third is that, before 1875, when the present section 1331's
predecessor was first enacted, most federal question cases had to be tried
in the state courts because Congress had not yet conferred upon the
federal trial courts general federal question jurisdiction. 3
Given the concurrency of large areas of federal question jurisdiction in state and federal trial courts today, and the pre-1875 primacy of
state trial court disposition of federal questions, it might seem to be a
matter of present indifference whether a state or federal court first
determines federal issues in any case. In recent years, however, the
United States Supreme Court has been curiously ambivalent toward the
right of litigants to have federal law questions initially decided by
federal, rather than state, trial courts.
10. R. FORRESTER, T. CURIER & J. MOYE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (2d ed. 1970).

11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964) provides, in pertinent part: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof are additional parties."
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958) provides, in pertinent part: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
13. Though congressional power-some have even regarded it as a duty (see Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) )to confer federal question jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts was present from
the nation's beginning, Congress, for almost the first hundred years, used this power
sparingly, and, except for a short-lived general federal question jurisdictional grant to
the federal courts (§ 11 of the Midnight Judges Act, 2 Stat. 92 (1801), repealed one
year later by § I of Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 1132; see Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 464 n.14 (1974)), relied upon it only to entrust narrowly limited types of
"federal question" cases to the jurisdiction of the United States circuit courts, the predecessors of the present federal district courts. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Only after the Civil War was concluded and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were added to the federal constitution
did Congress see fit, in 1875, to endow the federal first-instance courts with general federal question jurisdiction. That event represented a fundamental restructuring of federalisni concepts in the United States. Among other things, it reflected a basic distrust
of, or at least considerable hesitation about, the capacity of the states to give full scope
to the post-Civil War amendments in their own courts. It also was premised upon the
assumption that the federal judiciary, for all practical purposes enjoying lifetime tenure,
would be more vigorous, skillful and dedicated in the enforcement of the rights guaranteed by those amendments and their implementing federal statutes. Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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That such a right is of the highest importance and to be jealously
guarded was expressly recognized by the Court in England v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners.1 4 Notwithstanding the imperatives
of the abstention doctrine 15 and the conveniences of having all disputed
matters decided in a single judicial proceeding, England held that
parties who rightfully begin their litigation in federal court are entitled
to have federal law issues decided there if those issues remain in the case
after the state court to which the parties have been shunted by
"Pullman-type" abstention at least, has resolved previously unsettled
questions of state law and provided that the parties have not voluntarily
16
submitted those federal issues to the state court for disposition there.
More important than the result in England is its candid recognition
that ultimate review of federal law issues by the United States Supreme
Court [a federal tribunal] is an inadequate substitute for initial determination of those issues by a United States District Court [another federal
tribunal]-since how facts are found may be crucial to the ultimate
disposition of the questions of law.
The precise language of the Court in England is instructive:
It is true that, after a post-abstention determination and rejection of his federal claims by the state courts, a litigant could seek
direct review in this Court. [citations omitted] But such review,
even when available by appeal rather than only by discretionary
14. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
15. Reference to "the" abstention doctrine should not obscure the fact that several
similar, but different, doctrines are known by that name. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 196-208 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Wviucr].
Among the major varieties of abstention doctrines is the kind involved in England which
is often referred to as the "Pullman-type" from the case first applying it, Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Essentially, it requires a federal court
to refrain from deciding a case raising both a federal constitutional claim and a question
of unsettled state law that, if decided, could dispose of the case. In the application of
this doctrine, a federal court should stay the proceeding until the parties have an opportunity to receive a state court decision on the state issue. Another variety of abstention
requires a federal court to "refrain from exercising its jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs." WmGrr, supra at
199. Professor Wright has referred to this as "Burford-type" abstention from an important case in which the doctrine is elaborated, Burford v. Sun Oil Co. (319 U.S. 315
(1943) ). Id. at 200. Aside from the two doubtful situations in which abstention might
or might not be proper, i.e., to alleviate crowded federal dockets and to procure definitive
determinations of unsettled questions of state law without thereby avoiding either a premature and unnecessary federal constitutional decision or interference with a state's administration of its own affairs (compare Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228 (1943) with Lehman Brothers v. Shein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974))-there is the important type of abstention practiced under the rule of Younger v. Harris and companion
cases (see text accompanying note 8 supra), when because of notions of comity, equity
and federalism, a federal court refuses to issue an injunction or declaratory judgment
that would interfere with certain types of state proceedings already in progress.
16. See note 15 supra.
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writ of certiorari, is an inadequate substitute for the initial District
Court determination-often by three judges, 28 U.S.C. § 2281to which the litigant is entitled in the federal courts. This is true
as to issues of law; it is especially true as to issues of fact. Limiting
the litigant to review here would deny him the benefit of a federal
trial court's role in constructing a record and making fact findings.
How the
facts are fbund will often dictate the decision of federal
17
claims.

By contrast, in congressional enactments and other Supreme Court
decisions a general federal policy has evolved which expresses great
deference toward the right of state tribunals, once they have acquired
jurisdiction of a federal issue, to dispose of it without interference by any

action of lower federal courts. This policy is far from absolute, and the
exceptions to it are not always reconcilable on rational grounds.
One expression of this policy is found in the rules governing
removal of actions from state to federal courts. Under the general
removal statute, for example, 28 U.S.C. section 1441,18 which permits

removal by certain defendants of cases that would have been cognizable
as original actions in the federal courts, it has been held, because of the

"well-pleaded complaint doctrine,"' 19 that removal will not be permitted

if the federal issue first emerges in the defendant's answer.2 0 Even
U.S.C. section 1443, the Civil Rights Removal Statute, which, unlike the
general removal statute, permits the removability of a cause to be

determined by the allegations contained in a defendant's responsive
pleading,2 has been restrictively interpreted by the Sapreme Court so as

to limit drastically its potential applicability. 2 In the hypothetical
situations considered above, however, neither of these statutes would
17. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1948) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
19. See Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
20. Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1948) provides: "Any of the following civil actions or
criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law."
22. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.
780 (1966).
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create any direct problems for the parties seeking injunctive relief in the
federal courts, since none of the petitioners would be seeking to remove
a proceeding from a state to a federal court."3 Moreover, even the

technical requirements of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule would
present no special barriers to these litigants, it having been established

that when a plaintiff seeks a federal court injunction against alleged
federally unconstitutional conduct of a defendant, allegations in the
complaint setting forth the specific federal constitutional provisions that
have assertedly been violated by the defendant are necessary parts of the
plaintiffs pleading and will not be ignored as mere surplusage.24
Until recently, it was widely believed that another federal statutory
expression of a policy of deference to the right of state trial courts to
dispose of federal issues without federal trial court interference was
found in section 228325 of the Judicial Code, the so-called Anti-Injunction Statute. This code section generally prohibits federal courts from

enjoining pending state court proceedings unless certain exceptional
conditions exist. Those exceptional conditions are: 1) where the injunction is necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction; 2) where it
is granted to protect or effectuate its judgments; or 3) where the

injunction is expressly authorized by Act of Congress. But in Mitchum
v. Foster,'2 6 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983,27 the 1871 Civil

23. A bill now pending in Congress, based on § 1312(a) (2) of The ALl STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1969, would

permit, inter alia, a defendant to remove a civil action from state to federal court if an

amount in controversy requirement is met and if the defendant properly asserts a substantial federal defense that, if sustained, would dispose of the action. See S.1876, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Even were this to become law, however, there is some question
as to whether the action for marriage dissolution, described in the text accompanying
notes 1-3 supra, would be removable, in the light of Supreme Court decisions disclaiming
federal court jurisdiction in most types of domestic relations proceedings. See De La
Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899);
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (How. 21) 582 (1859). It has been forcefully suggested,
however, that the exclusion of domestic relations jurisdiction from the federal courts
stems from a reading of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964), and is not a
limitation on the diversity jurisdiction described in the judiciary article, U.S. Const. art.

III, § 2, cl. 1. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. See Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1885); cf. Lancaster v.
Kathleen Oil Co., 241 U.S. 551 (1916).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2283(a) (1948) provides: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
26. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

Rights Statute, which permits plaintiffs to sue in law or equity to redress
deprivations under color of state law of federal constitutional rights,
constitutes an express congressional authorization for a federal court
injunction against a pending state proceeding. Since, in the three
factual situations described above, the state court defendants or respondents would base their petitions for a federal court injunction against a
state court proceeding on the ground of the proceeding's unconstitutionality in whole or in part, section 2283 would not bar the maintenance of
their federal court suits.
A potentially more hazardous obstacle these parties might confront, however, arises from the important group of six decisions, the
most significant of which is Younger v. Hariris,28 in which the Supreme
Court held that a defendant in a state criminal prosecution may not,
except under extraordinary circumstances, enjoin it in the federal court,
or receive even declaratory relief there29 on the ground that it is based
on a state statute that violates the federal constitution, but must instead
lodge his or her federal constitutional objections in the state court, with
ultimate recourse to the federal judiciary being limited to review by the
United States Supreme Court. (The extraordinary circumstances under
which Younger permits federal court intervention in a pending state
prosecution are where the prosecution is commenced in bad faith or to
harass the defendant, or presents other unusual circumstances, such as
being based on a state statute that, in a federal constitutional sense,
might be described as facially rotten to the core. 0)
Reconciliation of Younger and its companion cases with England
is not easy. For if, as the Court acknowledged in England, review of
federal law issues by the United States Supreme Court, after they have
been first decided by a state trial court, is far less satisfactory than
review of a decision by a federal trial court, it would be anomalous to
require state criminal defendants to have their federal constitutional
objections to the state statutes upon which their prosecutions are based
initially decided by the state courts trying them, rather than by federal
courts in the first instance, if those are the tribunals they prefer.
One step toward reconciling these two lines of cases is to note that,
although in England itself, the Court recognized a fundamental right of
28. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The companion cases are: Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971).
29. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
30. The precise language of the Court, refers to a statute that is "flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it." 401 U.S. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).

Winter 19761

DECIDING FEDERAL LAW ISSUES

a "litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal
District Court to consider federal constitutional claims [not to] be
compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to
accept instead a state court's determination of those claims,"' 3 1 it nevertheless suggested that this right was not absolute. In a footnote, the
Court qualified the basic right to federal disposition of the constitutional
claim by stating that it exists "at least" in a case like England "not
involving the possibility of unwarranted disruption of a state administrative process." 32 For the latter exception, the Court cited Burford v. Sun
Oil Co.33 and Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway
Co.,3" both cases in which federal district courts were required to
abstain (and unlike what is done in "Pullman-type" abstention, to
dismiss the federal proceedings, rather than simply to stay them), where
federal court maintenance of the action might create "needless conflict
'35 This type of
with the administration by a state of its own affairs.
federal court abstention, developed in Burford and other cases, is designed not merely to avoid a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a difficult issue of federal constitutional law, which is the
underlying reason for the "Pullman-type" abstention, involved in England itself, but rather because of a belief that the state's sensibilities
would be particularly offended were a federal, rather than a state, court
initially to entertain a plaintiffs federal claims. This problem becomes
especially apparent in cases involving the state's administration of its
own government programs, such as the collection of its taxes36 or the
construction of its highways.17 Implicit in Burford and similar cases is
the assumption that the degree of exasperation, frustration and resentment a state might experience is substantially, indeed qualitatively,
greater when such programs risk interference by federal court rulings
than where that state's statutes, such as one imposing certain educational
requirements for those who would practice medicine in the state (the
type of statute challenged in England), might be held to violate the
federal constitution by a federal trial court. When that degree of
exasperation, frustration or resentment is reasonably anticipated, then,
notwithstanding a litigant's general right to have federal, rather than
state, trial courts initially dispose of his or her federal claims, those
claims must be entrusted to the state trial courts for initial disposition.
That principle, if indeed it is extractable from England, substantially
undermines the Court's ringing pronouncement, elsewhere in the same
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

375 U.S. at 415.
375 'U.S. at 415 n.5.
319 U.S. 315 (1943). Seenote 15supra.
341 U.S. 341 (1951).
WRmGHT, supra note 15, at 199.
Great Lakes Dredge &Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
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opinion, about "the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law."3 8 It also suggests that whenever a federal trial
court is asked to hold a state statute, practice or administrative ruling
invalid under federal law, the court must first determine whether its
potential interference will be regarded by the state as a major or only a
minor affront, i.e., whether the state's potential concerns more closely
resemble those in Burford than those in England. As will be seen
shortly, however, this principle goes far toward explaining and reconciling the Younger line of cases with England.
Moreover, on the surface at least, several features distinguish
Younger and its companion cases from the type of case England represents. In Younger resort was had to the federal courts after a state
criminal prosecution had commenced, whereas in England the plaintiff
had properly commenced a federal court proceeding before any had
been started in a state court. Indeed, since Younger the Court has held
in Steffel v. Thompson3 9 that the extraordinary requirements for federal
court intervention in a state court prosecution do not apply, at least
where declaratory relief is sought, 40 if the state court prosecution has not
in fact commenced-although, in order to satisfy "standing" requirements, that prosecution must have been threatened with sufficient immediacy.41
A second and perhaps more crucial difference is that in the Younger group of cases, the Court simply ignores the criminal defendant's
possible interest in having a federal tribunal decide the federal constitutional question initially because of the potential superiority, actual or
perceived, of the fact-finding process there over that of a state court as
suggested by England.
To be sure, the Court in Younger balances the degree of possible
irreparable injury to the state criminal defendant against the state's
interest in being able to dispose, in its own courts, of alleged violations
38. 375 U.S. at 415-16.
39. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
40. In Steffel, the plaintiff had originally sought a federal court injunction and declaratory relief against a threatened state prosecution. Following denial of all relief by
the district court, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit only from the denial of declaratory relief. That court suggested that
Younger required the application of its principles where a federal court injunction was
sought against a threatened prosecution, and that Samuels v. Mackell (401 U.S. 66
(1971)) required denial of declaratory relief under the same circumstances. Becker v.
Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1972). Since the plaintiff had abandoned his
request for an injunction, however, Justice Brennan's majority opinion expressly avoided
comment on the correctness of the court of appeals' views on the injunction question and
decided merely that, in any event, a declaratory judgment, being a less intrusive remedy,
does not require the presence of Younger's extraordinary irreparable injury.
at 463.

41. Id. at 459.

415 U.S.
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of its own criminal laws, including any question that those laws may
contravene the federal constitution. And, in the process, Younger holds
that because of the combined dictates of equity, comity and, most
importantly, "Our Federalism," the normal jurisdictional prerequisite to
equitable relief of irreparable injury is superseded by a requirement of
extraordinary irreparable injury, whenever a federal injunction is sought
against a pending state criminal prosecution. But in determining
whether that sort of extraordinry irreparable injury was faced by the
state defendant in Younger, the Court concerned itself exclusively with
whether the mere hardship in defending oneself in a state criminal
proceeding constituted such injury, and found that it did not.4 2 The
Court failed entirely, first to assess, and then to throw into the scales, the
value of the loss to the defendant in not having a federal tribunal
determine the facts underlying his federal constitutional objections to the
state statute under which he was charged. In other words, it gave no
consideration whatsoever to the possibility that the defendant's right to
have the United States Supreme Court ultimately review his constitutional claims might be an inadequate and unsatisfactory substitute for his
right to have those claims4" initially determined by a federal trial court,
42. Long before Younger, the doctrine had been well-established that the mere burden of being a defendant in a state criminal prosecution, even if that prosecution was
constitutionally invalid, was insufficient to establish the irreparable injury necessary to
enjoin the prosecution; the defendant, it was said, could always raise his constitutional
objections in the course of the prosecution itself. Only after Dombrowski v. Pfister was
decided, did some defendants in state criminal trials appear to have some possibilities
of procuring injunctions in the federal courts against pending state prosecutions. For
Dombrowski seemed to say that if the constitutional infirmity in the state prosecution
stemmed from the overbreadth or vagueness of the statute upon which it was basedand if the fact of the prosecution itself could be shown to have a "chilling effect" on
the exercise of preferred First Amendment freedoms-a federal court injunction could
issue-at least until the state had procured an authoritative limiting construction of the
statute that would constitutionally cover the kind of conduct of which the defendant was
accused. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Younger and its companion cases, however, the
Court, speaking of what it had done in Dombrowski, in effect said: "That is not what
we meant at all." Recognizing that there had been language in Dombrowski that might
have created the impression of easier federal court enjoinability of pending state prosecutions, the Court nevertheless rejected such a reading of Dombrowski and stated that
in that case it had not departed from the traditional requirement of a showing of extraordinary irreparable injury as a prerequisite to such an injunction.
43. To be sure, important distinctions are made in American law between "claims"
and "defenses." See Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). It
might even be urged that the use of the word "claims" to refer to what are essentially
a criminal defendant's constitutional defenses to a state charge do not come within what
was contemplated by the Court in England when it referred to the right to have a federal
claim decided by the federal trial courts in the first instance. Two answers may be suggested to this. One is that in England itself, the Court did not limit this right to plaintiffs alone, but held that it was one that belonged to "litigants." Thus, though the plaintiffs in England were those who originally brought the federal court action, it could have
been removed from state court by the defendants, had it originally been brought there,
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where he would have "the benefit of a federal trial court's role in
constructing a record and making fact findings."4 4
Had the Court engaged in that sort of assessment and balancing, its
result might have been the same. An injunction might still have been
denied because the balance of interests might still have been struck in
favor of the state's right to be free of federal trial court intervention once
it has begun a prosecution in its own courts for an alleged violation of its
own criminal law. Nevertheless recognition of this additional factor by
the Younger Court in weighing the interests of the criminal defendant
against those of the state, even if it had led to the same result, would
have facilitated the task that the Court will inevitably confront-namely,
to decide whether the Younger requirement of extraordinary irreparable
injury applies to the kinds of situations described at the start of this
article, i.e., where a federal court injunction is sought against a state
proceeding which is civil in nature and where the parties on both sides
of the litigation are private, rather than governmental, in character.
For another, and perhaps the most critical, difference between the
Younger line of cases and England is that, whereas the former were
criminal prosecutions, the latter was a civil proceeding. Thus, a longstanding rule of noninterference by the federal courts in pending state
criminal prosecutions, based in large part on a belief in the states'
special sensibilities about such interference, 45 was reemphasized and
clarified in Younger and its companion cases. In addition, though this
factor was not articulated in Younger and succeeding cases of the
"February sextet," the Court could very well have understood that,
despite the denial of federal trial court jurisdiction to enjoin a state court
prosecution in those cases, federal intervention might not be limited to
United States Supreme Court review; often a federal first-instance trial
of the facts of sorts might still be available in a habeas corpus proceeding, 46 under the combined doctrines of Fay v. Noia,47 Townsend v.
under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948). As a result, the Court
stated that even defendants can reserve their right to return to the federal court for a
disposition of their objections to plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims, if those issues
remain in the case after the state court has definitively resolved the previously unsettled
question of state law. 375 U.S. at 422 n.13. A second response to concerns about confusing claims and defenses in applying the England principle is that, although the federal

constitutional assertions might qualify as defenses in the state proceeding, they are transformed into claims when the state court defendant becomes a plaintiff in the federal
court and seeks to enjoin the state prosecution on grounds of its alleged federal unconstitutionality. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
44. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964).
45. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
46. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners. 375 U.S. at 417 n.8.
47. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Sain,48 and 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) 4 9 -although by no means in all
cases.
Concurring in Younger, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan,
emphasized that, since Younger and its companion cases all involved
state criminal prosecutions, the Court was not dealing "with the considerations that should govern a federal court when it is asked to intervene
in state civil proceedings, where, for various reasons, the balance might
be struck differently." 50 And in a footnote, these same justices suggested that, in contrast to a federal equity court's intervention in state
criminal prosecutions, the "offense to state interests is likely to be less in
a civil proceeding. A State's decision to classify conduct as criminal
provides some indication of the importance it has ascribed to prompt
and unencumbered enforcement of its law. By contrast, the State might
not even be a party in a proceeding under a civil statute."'" And even
in Mitchum v. Foster,52 which was decided the following year, the
Court, while resolving prior doubts by holding -that the 1871 Federal
Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, was one in which Congress
had "expressly" authorized federal court injunctions of state court proceedings, and thus was one of the "express" exceptions in the AntiInjunction Statute, carefully limited its holding to that question. It
expressed no view on whether the principles of comity, equity and "Our
Federalism" which underlie Younger and its companion cases applied to
efforts to obtain federal court injunctions of state civil proceedings.
Although the issue of whether the Younger doctrine applied to state civil
proceedings was raised in two cases that came before the Court in
197311 and 1974,11 those cases were decided on other grounds. In
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,55 however, decided in 1975, the Court finally
48. 372 U.S. 293,312-19 (1963).

49. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966) provides, in pertinent part: "In proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on
the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof
were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish
or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit"(1)
that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
"(3)

that the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hear-

ing .. "
50. 401 U.S. at 55.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 55 n.2.
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Speight v. Slayton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974).
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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came to grips, at least in a limited sense, with the question of Younger's
applicability to a state civil proceeding.
The state civil proceeding in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., was not an
ordinary one, i.e., not between private litigants. Although the defendant in Huffman was a private party (a lessee of a theater), plaintiffs
were public officials. Under an Ohio public nuisance statute providing
that a theatre exhibiting obscene films is a nuisance, and requiring some
and allowing other sanctions to be administered upon a finding that a
public nuisance has been committed, plaintiffs brought a nuisance proceeding against defendant's predecessor in an Ohio state court. That
court ordered, among other things, the closing of the theater because
"obscene movies" had been displayed there. The defendant, having
succeeded to the leasehold interest in the theatre before the state court
judgment was entered, then sought from a federal district court in Ohio
an injunction and declaratory judgment that the state statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable.
Concluding that the statute violated the First Amendment, the
federal court "permanently enjoined the execution of that portion of the
state court's judgment that closed" the theatre "to films which had not
been adjudged obscene." 50 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the plaintiff-appellants raised, inter alia, "the Younger problem"
i.e., whether the District Court "should have stayed its hand in deference
of federalism which find expression in Younger v.
to the principles
Harris."'5 7
By a vote of six to three, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that "in the circumstances presented here the
principles of Younger are applicable even though the state proceeding is
civil in nature."5 8 This limitation of the Huffman result to the particular circumstances of that case is reiterated at several other points in the
majority opinion."9 Indeed, that opinion is explicit on this point when
it says that, for "the purposes of the case before us. . . we need make
no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil
litigation." 60
What then did the Court find to be unique about the civil proceeding in Huffman that required the application of the Younger doctrine to
it, while recognizing that the same result might not necessarily follow in
all civil proceedings? The answer appears in a passage of the opinion
that first acknowledges that one of the major underpinnings of Younger
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 594.
See, e.g., id. at 603-05.
Id. at 607.
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was "the traditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary
system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution."" 1 The opinion, however, then states:
But whatever may be the weight attached to this factor in civil litigation involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a party to the Court
of Common Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of
and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. Thus, an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as
it would be were this a criminal proceeding. . . . Similarly, while
in this case the District Court's injunction has not directly disrupted
Ohio's criminal justice system, it has disrupted that State's efforts
to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws and
to obtain compliance with62 precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal law.
That the state proceeding, then, was "both in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes"6 3 was, in the Court's opinion, crucial to its
determination that Younger's extraordinary irreparable injury requirements were to be applied to Huffman.
Besides analogizing the particular civil proceeding in Huffman to
criminal proceedings generally; Justice Rehnquist's opinion seeks to rest
the Huffman result upon a variety of policy considerations presumably
extracted from language used by Justice Brennan in Steffel v.
Thompson. Steffel had held that -the Younger requirements do not
apply when federal declaratory relief is sought against state criminal
statutes before any state prosecution has been commenced. In that
context, Justice Brennan had written for the Steffel majority that:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice
system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. 4
This conclusion in Steffel, that the absence of the factors enumerated in the above passage allowed federal declaratory relief to issue under
the circumstances of that case, does not mean that the presence of any of
those factors inevitably triggers the application of the Younger requirements. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman proceeds
on the assumption that the latter proposition provides the guiding
principle.
61. Id. at 604.
62. Id. at 604-05.
63. Id. at 604.

64. 415 U.S. at 462.
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In applying that principle to the Huffman facts, the Court, as noted
earlier, first determines that though the state nuisance proceeding was
technically civil in character, it was also intimately related to the state's
enforcement of its criminal laws. Issuance of the federal district court
injunction had, in the Court's view, therefore failed an expanded version
of one of the Steffel "tests," i.e., though it had not disrupted a state's
criminal justice system, it did disrupt the "State's efforts to protect -the
very interests which underlie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance
with precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal laws." 65
Secondly, since the state nuisance proceedings were already in progress
when the federal court injunction was sought, Justice Rehnquist concludes that, by granting the injunction, the federal district court had
caused a duplication of legal proceedings.6 6 And finally, since the
federal court injunction had been sought on constitutional grounds, he
finds that federal intervention could "be interpreted 'as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles.' ,67
Except for the quasi-criminal character of the state nuisance proceedings involved in Huffman, the factors relied upon by the Court
would appear to be present in each of the three hypothetical situations
posited at the start of this article and in many more like them; namely,
the potential duplication of legal proceedings and a negative reflection
upon a state court's ability to enforce federal constitutional principles
whenever a federal court injunction is sought against a pending state
proceeding, though it is strictly civil in character.
How valid, in fact, are these considerations? Though duplication
of legal proceedings would seem at first blush a vice to be sedulously
avoided, an examination of federal-state court relations in other contexts
reveals that the principle is not absolute, and that countervailing considerations have on occasion justified such duplication, potential or actual.
One instance that comes immediately to mind is in the issuance of
federal court injunctions to stay state court proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
section 2361 at the request of a plaintiff in a federal statutory interpleader action.68 The federal interpleader device, often the only means
for a "stakeholder" to avoid multiple litigation and inconsistent determi65. 420 U.S. at 605.
66. Id. at 604.
67. Id. quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 462.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 provides in part: "In any civil action of interpleader or in
the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its
process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of the cotirt."
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nations as to his or her obligations to diverse claimants, is evidently
regarded as so valuable, that the duplication of legal proceedings that
may be caused by a section 2361 injunction is tolerable.
Similarly, removal of actions from state to federal courts can cause
varying degrees of duplication of legal proceedings, depending upon
which removal statute is invoked and how far the state court proceedings have progressed when removal is effected. Thus, if removal of a
civil action or proceeding is sought under 28 U.S.C. section 1441,9 the
general removal statute, there will ordinarily have been a minimum
investment of state court resources, since the petition for removal must
be filed within thirty days of the time that it first becomes clear that the
case is or has become removable. 70 By contrast, removal of a criminal
prosecution under the Civil Rights Removal Statute may be effected at
any time before trial,'71 which means that it can occur after the proceedings have been in progress for some time, if the conditions permitting
removal under that statute take that long to become apparent. In either
case, the slight or major duplication of legal proceedings is once again
regarded as justified by the values inhering in -the right to remove-a
right, incidentally, that is not granted anywhere in the federal constitution, but that has been with us from the First Judiciary Act of 1789.72
Moreover, the very value sought to be served by Younger, Steffel
and Huffman, i.e., avoiding federal court interference in a state's pending judicial proceeding, has at times been regarded as of sufficient
importance to justify simultaneous state and federal legal proceedings
over the same issue. Thus, in Kline v. Burke ConstructionCo.,73 it was
held that, notwithstanding the theoretical availability of relief under the
"all writs statute," federal courts will not enjoin state court proceedings
involving the same parties and issues in a pending federal court in
personam action. The right to plead the first judgment to be rendered
as res judicata in the other action was regarded by the Court as a
sufficient reason for allowing this aggravated instance of what is inveighed against in Huffman-the duplication of legal proceedings.7 4
What of the concern expressed in Huffman--or for that matter in
Younger and its companion cases-that a federal court injunction directed against a pending state proceeding, in the circumstances of these
cases, reflects negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles? The fact is that a basic apprehension about the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
398 U.S.

See note 18 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1965).
Id. § 1446(c) (1965).
WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 130.
260 U.S. 226 (1922).
See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
281, 286 (1970).
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ability of state courts to enforce federal constitutional principles, and a
belief in the superior ability of federal courts to perform this function,
have been cornerstones of federal policy since the end of the Civil War.
As the Supreme Court noted in Mitchum v. Foster:
This legislative history [behind 42 U.S.C. section 1983]
makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering
the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to
the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that
state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that
state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of
those rights;
and it believed that these failings extended to the state
75
courts.

Certainly, 'the grant of general federal question jurisdiction to the
federal first-instance courts in 1875, coupled with the general removal
statute, indicates a basic reservation about the state courts' ability properly to enforce federal constitutional principles. That reservation is
even today based on reasonable concerns. Even if regional idiosyncrasies are ignored (stronger anti-labor union bias in some parts of the
country than in others, varying degrees of racism or sexism in different
communities, etc.), the fact that federal district court judges, unlike
their counterparts in the state courts, hold their posts "during good
behavior" (which, in a practical sense, means in most cases "for life"),
and are therefore insulated from shifting political pressures on a whole
range of constitutional issues, raises at least a reasonable presumption
that federal constitutional questions will receive more objective and
competent consideration in the federal courts than in the state courts.
And, as England tells us, it is not a sufficient implementation of this
principle if the United States Supreme Court enters the picture when the
damage has already been done, i.e., when a state trial court has already
made the record and entered fact findings.78
Concern for the sensibilities of state judges when pending state
proceedings are halted as a result of a federal court injunction, as
expressed by the Huffman"7 decision, appears further misplaced if one
compares some procedural aspects of removal and injunctions. Under
28 U.S.C. section 1446, removal is effected when a copy of the removal
petition is filed with the clerk of the state court. 7 One result of
effecting a removal is immediately to deprive a state court of jurisdiction
over the proceeding; any substantive steps the state court purports to
take in the action are therefore null and void.7 9 This is a direct and
immediate interference with state judicial proceedings.
75. 407 U.S. at 242.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See note 17 &accompanying text supra.
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1965).
See McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 301 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
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By contrast, though Younger and its companions, as well as Steffel
and Huffman, refer to federal court injunctions against state proceedings, in reality those injunctions, or declaratory relief decrees, when
granted, are directed against parties to the state court suit, and not to the
state courts themselves. There is nothing in those injunctions or declaratory decrees that would prevent a state court from going forward with
the proceedings; all they signify is that if the person enjoined 0 ignores
the injunction and seeks to pursue the state court action, that person will
be in contempt of the federal court injunction and can be dealt with
accordingly.8 ' To be sure, in other contexts it has generally been held
that a federal court injunction directed against a state court litigant in
his efforts to secure a state court remedy is an injunction against state
82
court proceedings in violation of the federal Anti-Injunction Statute.
But that principle does not negate the suggested conclusion that the
federal court injunctions discussed herein represent a less drastic intrusion into a state court's conduct of its own affairs than does an authorized removal of an action from a state to a federal court.
All this suggests that, notwithstanding concerns for equity comity
and federalism expressed in Younger and its progeny, a federal district
court's direct and stark interference by way of injunction with the work
of a state court should be permitted if the value to be served by such
interference is perceived as outweighing its potential impairment of
harmonious relations between federal and state sovereignties. The crucial question is how to determine the value of the interest to be served if
federal intrusion is permitted.
One thing is certain, however. Value cannot be measured if the
Court fails to acknowledge the presence of the interest to be evaluated.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman is disappointingly ambiguous
on this point: it either ignores the presence of that interest, or to the
extent that it does not, subjects it to a "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" or
"Catch-22" treatment.
App. 1957); Hopson v. North American Ins. Co., 71 Id. 461, 466, 233 P.2d 799, 802
(1951).
80. Ordinarily the plaintiff in the state court proceeding.
81. "It is proper to add that the right to enjoin an individual, even though a state
official, from commencing suits under circumstances already stated, does not include the
power to restrain a court from acting in any case brought before it, either of a civil
or criminal nature, nor does it include power to prevent any investigation or action by
a grand jury. The latter body is part of the machinery of a criminal court, and an injunction against a state court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government. If an injunction against an individual is disobeyed, and he commences proceedings before a grand jury or in court, such disobedience is personal only, and the court
or jury can proceed without incurring any penalty on that account." Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908).
82. See, e.g., Toucy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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For example, in Huffman the theatre owner appellee had sought to
persuade the court that the Younger requirements should be limited to
criminal proceedings, because:
[Although] a state court criminal defendant may, after exhaustion
of his state remedies, present his constitutional claims to the federal
courts through habeas corpus, no analogous remedy is available to
one, like appelleee, whose constitutional rights may have been incannot result in custodial defringed in a state proceeding which
83
tention or other criminal sanction.
Responding to this argument, Justice Rehnquist at first appears to
ignore the England principle entirely when he states that, "[a] civil
litigant may, of course, seek review in this Court of any federal claim
properly asserted in and rejected by state courts,"8 4 and that, in the
Huffman circumstances, "an appeal to this Court lies as a matter of
right. 8' 5 Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the appellee in Huffman
was therefore "assured of eventual consideration of its claim by this
Court, '80 while apparently correct as far as it goes, may be of small
comfort to someone in the appellee's shoes if, when that consideration
occurS, the facts have already been found and the record made by a state
trial court on his or her federal constitutional claims.
Immediately after this discussion, however, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion appears to recognize the England principle, without identifying
it as such, and then treats the problem it raises in a manner that suggests
the recognition was far from perfect. He states first:
Appellee's argument, that because there may be no civil counterpart to federal habeas it should have contemporaneous access to
a federal forum for its federal claim, apparently depends on the
unarticulated major premise that every litigant who asserts a federal claim is entitled to have
it decided on the merits by a federal,
87
rather than a state, court.
It is not clear that the phrase "on the merits" used in this passage
necessarily means in a first-instance proceeding, rather than on appeal,
although in context and on balance, it appears to refer to trial court
proceedings. Justice Rehnquist's response to this contention, however,
raises more problems than it solves:
We need not consider the validity of this premise in order to reject
the result which appellee seeks. Even assuming, arguendo, that litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolution of all federal issues, that entitlement is most appropriately asserted by a
83. 420 U.S. at 605.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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state litigant when he seeks to relitigate a federal issue adversely
determined in completed state proceedings. 88
If Justice Rehnquist means by this that, notwithstanding the disposition of these claims in a state court trial, the litigant is entitled to a
de novo trial on the same claims in a subsequent federal trial, can such
a procedure be reconciled with the previously expressed policy of nonduplication of legal proceedings in the state and federal courts? In a
footnote to the last quoted passage, however, Justice Rehnquist makes
it clear that he did not intend to suggest therein that the proceedings in
the federal court would be de novo on the federal constitutional claims
already adjudicated in the state court proceedings when he states:
We in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of access to
a federal forum for the disposition of all federal issues, or that the
normal rules of res judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate
to bar relitigation in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973). Our assumption is made solely as a
means of disposing of appellee's contentions without confronting
issues which have not been briefed or argued in this case.8 9
If this is not a "Catch-22" situation, it is difficult to know what is.
People in the appellee's circumstances, i.e., those wishing to have their
federal claims determined initially by a federal trial court, are in effect
told: if your opponent has started the litigation in a state court, then you
must raise your federal claims in that proceeding. You may reassert
those claims in a subsequent proceeding in a federal trial court, but
because of res judicata and estoppel principles, you will probably be
bound by the determination of those claims already made in the state
trial court. Oh yes, you may seek United States Supreme Court review
of your constitutional claims by appealing from the state court's judgment, but you will be bound by the state trial court's record and fact
findings.
This is hardly a satisfactory resolution of the concerns expressed by
the appellee in Huffman or of those implicit in the hypothetical situations described earlier. Unfortunately, even in the dissenting opinion
filed in Huffman by Justice Brennan, in which Justices Douglas and
Marshall joined, 90 there is only a minor reference to the England case
88. Id.
89. Id. at 606 n.18.
90. That dissenting opinion argues: 1) Younger was limited to criminal prosecutions. 420 U.S. at 613-14. 2) The Huffman result is only the first step toward extending to civil proceedings generally the holding of Younger. Id. at 613. 3) To do so
would in effect nullify the statutory and judge-made exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
statute (28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948)) with respect to civil proceedings. 420 U.S. at 61416. 4) This is particularly inappropriate in the case of a "federal plaintiff" as in Huffman bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 616-17. 5) Requiring this plaintiff to have exhausted, as a state court defendant, its state appellate remedies undermines
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without an examination of the full implications of that case for the
Huffman problem. 9
Had the Court given full consideration to the England doctrine, it
could very well have determined that, notwithstanding its perception of
the state nuisance proceeding in that case as a quasi-criminal proceeding, it was sufficiently removed from the direct enforcement of a state's
criminal laws to justify the federal court injunction when the value of the
state court defendant's right to have a federal court determine his or her
federal defenses is thrown into the balance.
A fortiori, where enforcement of the state's criminal law policies
either is not, or is only remotely, implicated in the state proceeding-as
is true in the three hypothetical situations posited above, or in others like
them-a litigant's right to a federal tribunal for the initial determination
of federal issues looms even larger. Any doubt as to how the scales
should be tipped in other situations (e.g., in Younger, where state
criminal law policies are directly implicated; in Burford, where the
state's administration of its own governmental functions are in issue; in
Stefanelli v. Minard9" where orderly procedures in a state criminal
prosecution are at stake; or even in Huffman, where the state's resort to
a civil proceeding to implement a fundamental criminal law policy was
involved) in which one of the parties was governmental in character,
should not prevent federal court cognizance of state court defendants'
suits to enjoin state court proceedings on federal constitutional grounds
where those proceedings are essentially civil in character and in which
none of the opposing parties is a public official.
In all probability, recognition of this principle would cause a
substantial increase in the work of the federal courts. Many state court
defendants who now appear to be satisfied with initial state court
determination of their federal constitutional defenses would be greatly
tempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in an injunction
or declaratory relief proceeding to decide the validity of those defenses.
But if England means what it says, the increased workload of the
federal courts is a result to be welcomed, rather than deplored. It
the holding of Monroe v. Pape (365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)) and other cases "that a
federal plaintiff suing under § 1983 need not exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before filing his action under § .1983 in federal district court." 420 U.S. at 617.
91. 420 U.S. at 617.
92. 342 U.S. 117 (1951). Stefanelli held that federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when it was
claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. "Here," stated the Court,
"the considerations governing .[the exercise of equitable discretion] touch perhaps the
most sensitive source of friction between States and Nation, namely, the active intrusion
of the federal courts in the administration of the criminal law for the prosecution of
crimes solely within the power of the States." Id. at 120. See also Perez v. Ledesma,

401 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1971).
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would mean that the federal trial courts would, in effect, be restored to

their rightful place in our constitutional scheme.
Moreover, should Congress enact S. 1876, 93 introduced by Senator
Burdick and based upon the American Law Institute's Proposed Revision of the Federal Judicial Code 94 these state court defendants would
be able to procure substantially equivalent relief, with only a negligible
net increase in the federal courts' workload. It is even possible that a
reduction would result, for the three state defendants or respondents
described in our hypothetical situations then would not need to seek
federal court injunctive or declaratory relief in order to receive a federal
trial court determination of their constitutional claims. The bill, if
adopted, would permit removal to the federal court if the state court
defendant pleaded a substantial federal defense that would, if sustained,
dispose of the case,9 5 thereby overruling by legislation the illogical result
of the 1894 case of Tennessee v. Union & Planter'sBank.9 6 At the
same time, the Burdick bill, while not eliminating the diversity jurisdiction, would drastically limit the scope of that jurisdiction by denying it
to those who would invoke it if they have a substantial personal or
business connection with the state in which
the federal court, whose
97
jurisdiction they seek to invoke, is located.
But S. 1876 has been pending in one form or another for four
93. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
AMERICAN

A similar bill, based generally on

LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvisioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE

AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY], was introduced by Senator Burdick in the United States Senate in 1971. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
See generally Fraser, Proposed Revision of the Jurisdiction of the Federal District
Courts,8 VAL. U.L. REv. 189 (1974).
94. ALI STUDY, supra note 93.
95. S. 1876 § 1312(a) (2) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, a civil action brought in a State court may be removed to the district court of
the United States for the district embracing the place where such action is pending ...
"(2) if the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $15,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, by any defendant, or any plaintiff, by or against whom, subsequent
to the initial pleading, a substantial defense arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States is properly asserted that, if sustained, would be dispositive
of the action or of all counterclaims therein."
96. 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
97. S. 1876 § 1302 provides in part: "The jurisdiction of the district courts under
subsection (a) of section 1301 of this title [which provides for general diversity of citizenship jurisdiction] shall be subject to the following exceptions:
"(b) (1) No corporation incorporated or having its principal place of business in
the United States, and no partnership, unincorporated association, or sole proprietorship
having its principal place of business in the United States, that has and for a period
of more than two years has maintained a local establishment in a State, can invoke that
jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, in any district in that State in any action
arising out of the activities of the establishment."
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years now, and it is difficult to tell when, if, or in what form, Congress
will enact it. Since an immediate decrease in the volume of diversity
cases heard by the federal district courts does not appear to be imminent, the question arises whether the federal judicial system can tolerate
the increase in the federal district courts' workload that would inevitably
occur if Younger's extraordinary requirements were held not to apply
when a state court defendant seeks federal injunctive or declaratory
relief against state court civil proceedings between private parties.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Elbert,98 expressed strong views on the prospect of increasing the
federal courts' workload. 9 To be sure, Elbert was a diversity case in
which the plaintiff, in Justice Frankfurter's view, had played "at the
game of working . . . the perverse potentialities of diversity jurisdiction."'10 0 But Frankfurter's reservations in Elbert about responding to
the increased demands on the federal judiciary by increasing the number
of federal judges was not limited to situations in which those demands
were produced only by the expansion of the federal diversity jurisdiction. He wrote:
The business of courts . . . is drastically unlike the business of factories. The function and role of the federal courts and the nature
of their judicial process involve impalpable factors, subtle but farreaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the judicial plant
...*. In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady increase
in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to affect the whole system . . . [Inflation of the number of district
judges] will result, by its own Gresham's law, in a depreciation of
the judicial currency and the consequent impairment of the prestige
and of the efficacy of the federal courts. 101
Was Justice Frankfurter correct in this conclusion? Would the
prestige of the federal judiciary suffer if substantially more judges were
added? Stated differently, do federal court judges enjoy their enormous
prestige because they are so few in number, relatively speaking? Empirical evidence on this is, of course, difficult to come by. But one can't
help speculating that the source of the federal judiciary's prestige and
influence resides in the encouragement of judicial independence provided by Article III of the Constitution in prohibiting any reduction of
federal judicial salaries or removal from office during good behavior,
and the consequent attractiveness federal judicial appointments have for
the ablest American attorneys. As for the effect upon the efficiency of
an increased federal judicial plant, the second of Judge Frankfurter's
98. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
99. Id. at 57-60.
100. Id. at 57.
101. Id. at 59. See also H.
28-31, 44-46 (1973).
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concerns, increasing the number of federal district court judges would
probably at some point require an accomodating increase in the number
of judges on the various United States courts of appeals, and conceivably, some day, even on the United States Supreme Court.102 Whether
that would result in decreased efficiency of the federal judiciary is at
best a debatable proposition. But even if this can be shown to be true,
efficiency or administrative convenience has never been regarded as a
summum bonum in American law; 03 efficiency in this context must be
weighed against other values served by the maintenance of the federal
judicial system. In this light it would appear that making federal trial
courts available to those with federal defenses as well as those with
federal claims, for the cogent reasons expressed by the Court in England
v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners 04 -- at least when this would
not injure extraordinarily important state interests-is a value that
transcends any administrative inconvenience to the federal courts, even
assuming that such inconvenience would in fact ensue-an assumption
that may not be at all warranted.
In this connection, it may be useful to suggest that Supreme Court
recognition of the importance to litigants of a federal trial court determination of federal claims has not always been as clear as the expressions
in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners'0 ° would
appear to indicate. Pronouncements by various members of the Court
on this question, when compared, are often ambivalent, if not schizophrenic. For example, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman v.
Pursue,Ltd., rather casually implies that ultimate Supreme Court review
is an adequate substitute for initial federal trial court determination of
federal constitutional claims, notwithstanding the specific view to the
contrary expressed in England."" Similar views are expressed in the
1955 decision of Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.
Co. 0 7 There, the Court grappled with the question of whether the
1948 enactment of 28 U.S.C. section 2283, the Anti-Injunction Statute,
was designed to allow federal court injunctions of pending state proceedings only in the limited types of situations expressly described as
102. 348 U.S. at 47-49.
103. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971).
104. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
105. Id.
106. "A civil litigant may, of course, seek review in this Court of any federal claim
properly asserted in and rejected by state courts. Moreover, where a final decision of
a state court has sustained the validity of a state statute challenged on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to this Court lies as a matter of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
Thus, appellee in this case was assured of eventual consideration of its claim by this
Court." 420 U.S. at 605. The England case itself, however, is not mentioned in Justice
Rehnquist's Huffman opinion.
107. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
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exceptions in the statute, or whether an injunction might issue whenever
the sense of the situation appeared to justify it. Responding to the
argument that delay in that case might undercut a federal legislative
scheme, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The assumption upon which the argument proceeds is that
federal rights will not be adequately protected in the state courts,
and the "gap" complained of is impatience with the appellate
process if state courts go wrong. But during more than half of our
history Congress, in establishing the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, in the main relied on the adequacy of the state judicial systems to enforce federal rights, subject to review by this Court ...
The prohibition of § 2283 is but continuing evidence of confidence
in the state courts, reinforced by08a desire to avoid direct conflicts
between state and federal courts.'
Similarly, even in Dombrowski v. Pfister,0 9 perhaps the high water
mark of federal injunction against a threatened state prosecution, Justice
Brennan observed that:
It is generally to be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will
observe constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court, and
that the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury
necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceeedings."10
Of course, the "orderly state proceedings" referred to in Dombrowski, as
well as those in Younger v. Harris"' and its companions, were orderly
state criminal proceedings in which, as we have seen, the state may be
said to have a very special stake.
More recently, in a 1970 case again dealing with congressional intentions in the 1948 Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2283, Justice
Black was moved to declare that "Proceedings in state courts should
normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower
federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate
courts and ultimately this Court. 1"2 To be sure, this case involved the
section 2283 prohibitions against federal court injunctions to stay state
proceedings, a question that has been rendered moot in our hypothetical
situation because of the Court's subsequent decision in Mitchum v.
Foster."' At the same time, if one keeps the England principle in
mind, one cannot help marvelling at the unquestioning manner in which
the availability of United States Supreme Court review is cited as an
adequate means of correcting state court error.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
281, 287
113.

Id. at 518.
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id.at484-85.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S.
(1970).
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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England, on the other hand, is not the only important United States
Supreme Court case recognizing that Supreme Court review of federal
constitutional issues, once those issues have been shaped by state trial
courts, is an inadequate substitute for a federal trial of those issues in the
first instance. As long ago s 1908, Justice Holmes observed in Prentis
v. Atlantic CoastLine Co.:114
If the railroads were required to take no active steps until they
could bring a writ of error from this court to the Supreme Court
of Appeals [of Virginia] after a final judgment, they- would come
here with the facts already found against them. But the deterrmination as to their rights turns almost wholly upon the facts to
be found. Whether their property was taken unconstitutionally depends upon the valuation of the property, the income to be derived
from the proposed rate, and the proportion between the two-pure
matters of fact. When those are settled the law is tolerably plain.
All their constitutional rights, we repeat, depend upon what the
facts are found to be. They are not to be forbidden to try those
facts before a court of their own choosing, if otherwise competent." 5
Those observations of Justice Holmes assume special significance
when note is taken of that portion of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Prentisstating that:
[I]f the final action of the commission . . . amounts to confiscation of the property of the corporation... then the way is plainly
open to bring that question to this court upon writ of error ...
In this way any Federal right, specially set up and denied by the
state tribunals, can be adequately protected by the final judgment
of this court." 6
In sum, the expressions of faith in the ability of state tribunals to
dispense federal constitutional justice found in many cases would appear
to be at odds with the recognition, in other cases, of the right of a
litigant with federal constitutional claims to have them adjudicated by a
federal court. Perhaps these contrasting views can be reconciled by
establishing the principle that, "though the state courts are good, the
federal courts are better." Should reconciliation of these contrasting
views prove inordinately difficult to achieve, it is submitted that the
Court should squarely hold that the primacy of the federal judiciary in
deciding federal law questions is a principle that transcends any preCivil War assumptions about the ability of state courts adequately to
dispose of federal constitutional issues in the first instance. The mindless repetition of such platitudes about the role of the state courts is
gratuitous in the light of all that has since occurred: the Civil War itself,
the post-Civil War federal constitutional amendments, the enactment of
114. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
115. Id. at 228.
116. Id. at 239.
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what is today 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the decision in Mitchum v.
Foster,17 and finally-and perhaps most importantly-the decision and
rationale of England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.118
Together, these factors suggest the establishment of at least a rebuttable
presumption that in any given case, the most appropriate forum for
deciding a federal constitutional issue in the first instance is a federal,
rather than a state, trial court. Among the ways such a presumption
could be rebutted would be: 1) a showing that the parties had unanimously chosen a state trial court for initial disposition; (plaintiffs by
choosing the state court in the first instance, defendants by not seeking
injunctive, declaratory, or other relief in the federal courts); or 2) a
showing that the potential injury to a crucial state interest would outweigh the value to the litigants of having a federal court make the initial
decision. In the absence of such, or similar, showings, federal district
courts ought to be able to take away and decide, to the extent not
prevented from doing so by the Anti-Injunction Act," 9 28 U.S.C.
section 2283, any pending state court proceeding raising federal constitutional issues. In such instances, there is little room for exaggerated
solicitude about potential duplication of proceedings or negative reflections upon the ability of state courts to enforce federal constitutional
principles.
In deciding whether a federal court injunction or declaratory judgment should issue against a pending state proceeding, the United States
Supreme Court has thus far consistently ignored the value to the person
seeking such relief of having a federal rather than a state court find the
facts and make the record on his or her federal constitutional claims-a
value that elsewhere, most notably in the England case, was recognized
by the Court to be of fundamental importance. Had the Court recognized this interest of litigants in Younger and its companion cases, and
in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., the results of those cases might still have
been the same. In those cases, the Court might have determined that,
even when the litigants' right to a federal fact-finder and record-maker
was thrown into the balance, the interests of the states involved in those
cases outweighed such right. But as the interests of the state in the
litigation recede-as in civil proceedings between private parties onlythe balance should shift. When the Supreme Court directly confronts
the question of whether the extraordinary requirements of Younger v.
Harris' 20 should apply to such proceedings, there would be ample
justification for it to hold that they do not. A defendant in a state civil
proceeding should therefore be permitted to seek a federal court injunc117.
118.
119.
120.

407 'U.S. 225 (1972).
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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tion or a declaratory judgment against the plaintiff in such proceeding
on the ground that it is based on a statute, as written or as applied, that
violates federal constitutional law, without having to show that the state
proceeding was instituted by that plaintiff in bad faith, or to harass the
defendant, or is otherwise based on a statute that is, in a constitutional
sense, rotten to the core.

